. Human capital explanations focus on workers' education and accumulated experience. Because women traditionally have different educational backgrounds, shorter tenures, and more interrupted careers than men, these variables explain part of the wage gap (Blau & Beller, 1988; Gunderson, 1989) . Gender segregation across occupations (Sorensen, 1989) , industries (Hodson & England, 1986) , and firms (Groshen, 1991) accounts for another large component of the gap. The still "unexplained" portion of wage differentials is usually interpreted as evidence of employer discrimination.
Looking specifically at employer-based inequality, one research stream emphasizes organizational characteristics (Baron, Mittman, & Newman, 1991; Reskin, 2000) . This work has focused mostly on the negative effect of job and establishment gender segregation on earnings (Huffman & Velasco, 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993 . For example, Nelson and Bridges (1999) , in several case studies of between-job wage differences, concluded that the gender compositions of occupations and the gender of individual employees are more predictive of pay disparities than are market pay rates. Through organizational processes such as hiring and promotion, men and women are allocated to gender-segregated work units or job titles, with predominantly female jobs receiving lower pay than predominantly male jobs (Bielby & Baron, 1984; Bridges & Villemez, 1994; Maume, 1999) . These lower earnings of women relative to men because of gender segregation within employers cannot be explained by lower productivity (TomaskovicDevey & Skaggs, 1999) and are not mitigated by employer policies such as formalization of employment procedures (Huffman & Velasco, 1997) .
Adding to this research on organizational characteristics, we explore the effects of unionization on wage differentials by gender within nine manufacturing industries. Unionization has rarely entered studies of employer-based gender inequality, except as a control variable (e.g., Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs, 1999) . This is surprising because perhaps the most important factor influencing wage determination within firms is whether wages are subject to collective bargaining. Statistics indicate that union membership helps raise workers' pay in general and narrows the income gap that leaves women and minorities at a disadvantage. For example, the Economic Policy Institute (1999) reported that union workers overall earn 32% more than those not in unions. The union wage benefit is most pronounced among women and minorities: In 1998, women in unions earned 39% more than their nonunion counterparts. These statistics suggest the potential relevance of unions in reducing the gender wage gap, but research evidence is scant (Gander, 1997; Nelson & Bridges, 1999) .
In this article, we suggest that unionization reduces the gender wage gap for several reasons. First, unions tend to establish wage-setting, bureaucratic procedures that reduce wage dispersion among employees covered by the same collective bargaining agreement, especially those working in the same occupation (Freeman & Medoff, 1984) . Therefore, unionization should reduce the wage gap for women working alongside men in the same establishments and jobs. Second, unions tend to reduce wage differentials within establishments regardless of occupation, as well as across establishments, on the basis of set pay for specific jobs (Freeman, 1980) . This wage homogenization tendency would reduce wage differences between segregated female and male jobs. Third, the management of unionized establishments is more likely to adhere to such bureaucratic wage rules, reducing arbitrariness in wage rates and consequently reducing the potential for discrimination (Cornfield, 1987) . Finally, a more direct mechanism through which unions might reduce the gender gap in pay is explicit efforts to restore pay equity, that is, to raise pay in mostly female jobs relative to predominantly male jobs (Acker, 1989) .
To examine whether unions help reduce the pay gap between men and women working in similar occupations, our study looks at within-establishment union effects in production jobs, using individual-level data from nine industries. Because collective bargaining takes place at the establishment level, one needs information on both individual and establishment attributes, and such data are difficult to find. The Industry Wage Surveys (IWS) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provide these data. We include in the study nine manufacturing industries that vary substantially in the proportions of men and women employed, from 5% to 92% female. Within each industry, surveys include a representative sample of several hundred establishments and several thousand employees, facilitating the generalization of results to each particular industry and providing a unique opportunity to test the effects of collective bargaining on wages.
These IWS data overcome three important shortcomings common to prior studies of organizational determinants of the gender gap. According to Huffman and Velasco (1997) , prior data have (a) concentrated on census occupational categories rather than specific work settings, (b) downplayed organizational attributes, and (c) focused on small samples of establishments in specific labor markets. By contrast, the IWS provide data on manufacturing industries with information on a large proportion of each employer's workforce and extensive detail on establishment characteristics. Besides unionization, variables include organizational attributes such as region, establishment size, and gender composition. Data on individuals include detailed occupation and pay method, well-known variables affecting the wage gap.
In sum, our study adds to recent research on organizational determinants of the earnings gap between men and women in several ways. First, we focus on a critical determinant of wages: unionization. Second, we test our hypothesis across occupations, establishments, and industries that vary in the gender composition of the labor force and in the levels of unionization. These features allow a more precise study of the relationship between wage differentials and unionization than other data sets in which employees are not matched with their firms, only a few firms are surveyed, or only information on broadly defined occupations is included (Anderson, Doyle, & Schwenk, 1990; Huffman & Velasco, 1997) . Before presenting our results, we elaborate on the theoretical rationale for our proposition.
EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON THE GENDER WAGE GAP: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
How does unionization affect the gender gap in pay? Research suggests that wage determination differs in unionized and nonunionized establishments. We look at how these wage determination processes affect gender wage inequality, distinguishing between indirect and direct effects of unions.
THEORY: INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect effects occur because unions put in place bureaucratic systems that tend to lower pay variation for all employees. First, union policies generally aim to obtain pay equality across and within establishments, standardizing wage levels and thus reducing wage dispersion among workers covered by union contracts (Card, 1992; Freeman & Medoff, 1984) . Though not universally applied, standard-rate wage policies can be defined as "uniform piece or time rates among comparable workers across establishments and impersonal rates or ranges of rates in a given occupational class within establishments" (Freeman, 1980, p. 4) . A consequence of standard wage rates is the minimization of the impact of individual differences among workers in similar jobs within establishments. Some evidence exists that unions reduce the gap between White and Black men (Freeman & Medoff, 1984) . Likewise, unions may reduce the gender gap through adherence to wage rates assigned to job classification systems. Therefore, within a given establishment and occupation, wage variation for men and women will be reduced, assuming other individual characteristics such as seniority remain constant. As long as both men and women occupy similar jobs and are covered by similar collective bargaining agreements, wage differences between them should be lower.
These collective bargaining wages are associated with bureaucratic procedures set up over time to regulate labor-management relationships and reduce subjective pay allocations by supervisors (Slichter, Healy, & Livernash, 1960) . Previous research on ethnic differences in layoff chances suggests the importance of these procedures: In unionized workplaces, management's adherence to bureaucratic rules such as seniority makes these rules better predictors of layoff chances across ethnic groups (Cornfield, 1987) . Among nonunionized workers, by contrast, the determinants of ethnic inequality in layoffs are less clear. Applying the same logic, we expect the management of a unionized firm to follow collective bargaining outcomes in wage setting, thereby generating more predictable wages for male and female employees than would be the case in nonunionized workplaces, where managerial discretion is greater.
THEORY: DIRECT EFFECTS
In addition to indirect effects, we expect unionization to have a direct influence on the wage gap. Because more women are currently organized than ever before, some unions have adopted pay equity as a strategy to eliminate the pay gap. They have also adopted policies to combat the gender segregation of occupations, which is related to the wage gap (Hallock, 1993) . These strategies do not always arise spontaneously, but at the request of female members (Howell & Mahon, 1996) . Regardless of the motivation, such pay equity policies would increase the earnings of women more than those of men, thereby narrowing the gender gap. Although this effect seems rather obvious, empirical research is scant and inconclusive, with some studies suggesting that unions have neglected women's issues (Cook, 1991) .
In summary, theory suggests that unions would reduce gender gap by virtue of indirect effects in reducing wage dispersion within firms and a potentially direct effect in setting pay equity policies.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Evidence for these unionization effects seems to exist only for male workers. The effect of unions on female wage inequality is relatively understudied (Pfeffer & Ross, 1981) , and little research exists on the gap itself. Studies of wage policies under collective bargaining agreements indeed indicate that unionization reduces wage dispersion among union members by equalizing wages across and within establishments. This evidence comes primarily from all-male data sets (Lewis, 1986) . For example, Freeman's (1980) study focused on men and the wage differential between white-and blue-collar workers within establishments. Pfeffer and Ross (1980) also showed that among men, unions operate to reduce wage differentiation and individual characteristic effects. Evidence for women is inconclusive at best. A few studies have looked at union wage premiums for women only (Main & Reilly, 1992) and found that unions have no effect on wage dispersion among women (Pfeffer & Ross, 1981) . In a recent study based on Current Population Survey data for individuals between 1973 and 1992, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) found that the presence of unions explains an important portion of wage inequality among men only and that changing unionization patterns explain relatively little of the recent rise in female wage dispersion.
Although they are important, these studies are applicable to comparisons of within-gender samples. Research focusing on how unions affect the wage differential between men and women is even scarcer. Unlike our study, the few articles that have looked at unions and the gender gap have focused on the public sector because most unionized women work there (Baron & Newman, 1990; Bridges & Nelson, 1989) or used individual-level data aggregated across national economies without considering establishment-level information on collective bargaining coverage (Doiron & Riddell, 1994; Even & Macpherson, 1993; Freeman & Leonard, 1987) .
Because the theoretical mechanisms reviewed above operate at the establishment level, so do the data we use in this study. Our choice is important for several reasons. First, collective bargaining agreements usually differ among establishments and specify wage rates for different jobs so that every employee working in a given job earns approximately the same amount. Second, evidence highlights the role of employer policies in shaping the wage gap (Groshen, 1991; Milkman, 1987) . Interemployer wage differentials account for a great share of the gap between men and women because men tend to work in higher pay firms (Gunderson, 1989; Halaby, 1979) . Third, gender segregation is strongly related to the wage gap, especially segregation within jobs and establishments (Huffman & Velasco, 1997; Petersen & Morgan, 1995 ). Therefore, firm-level data with information on wage-setting processes are critical to understanding gender-related wage differentials.
In sum, in this study, we ask: How does unionization affect the gender wage gap among individual men and women working in the same establishment who are covered by similar collective bargaining agreements? Is the gap smaller in unionized than in nonunionized establishments? We investigate this question by adding an interaction term of unionization and gender to an equation containing individual and establishment characteristics. We expect this interaction to be positive.
DATA
The IWS of the BLS provide nationwide data on establishment and production workers' characteristics. We obtained access to nine manufacturing industries that vary widely in their proportions of men and women employed: industrial chemicals, nonferrous foundries, paints and varnishes, textile dyeing and finishing, wood household furniture, cotton fiber textiles, wool textiles, miscellaneous plastics, and men's and boys' shirts. Our main criterion in selecting these industries was to cover the spectrum from low to high proportions of women in an industry's workforce, that is, to obtain broad variation in our independent variable while varying also the type of product manufactured. These are almost all of the manufacturing industries included in the IWS between 1974 and 1985 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976a Labor, , 1976b Labor, , 1977a Labor, , 1977b Labor, , 1977c Labor, , 1977d Labor, , 1977e, 1977f, 1982 .
1 In 1985, the IWS stopped including questions about employee gender, so later surveys are not valid for our research question. Therefore, we have access to most of the manufacturing industries surveyed during the period, precisely the same industries studied in other research on the wage gap (Groshen, 1991; Petersen & Morgan, 1995) . In each industry, the BLS drew a stratified random sample of establishments, including a sufficient mix of union and nonunion establishments to test our prediction. The number of establishments surveyed ranges from 57 in the wool textiles industry to 876 in the miscellaneous plastics industry. Data on establishment characteristics include size, region, urban area, and technology. These data are combined with information on individuals, including gender, occupation, establishment, method of wage payment, and hourly earnings. Our unit of analysis is the individual employee.
Apart from the contributions to research already explained, there are several methodological advantages to using these data. First, wage data used for our dependent variable are in hourly earnings form. Because one confounding factor in explaining gender wage differences is that men and women work different numbers of hours, our data avoid the drawback of having to control for the estimated number of hours worked.
Second, potential gender bias in the sample of occupations surveyed is reduced because only production workers are included. Moreover, the data on hourly earnings are collected for narrowly defined occupations representative of the range of activities performed in the industry (Anderson et al., 1990) . Thus, results are generalizable within industries. The surveys provide detailed occupational coding, which often corresponds to the listing in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977a). For example, in the miscellaneous plastics industry, the list of detailed occupations includes titles such as "extrusion-press operators (set up and operate)"; "extrusion-press operators (operate only)"; "plastic cutters, machine"; and "scrap-preparing operators." Similarly, in the textile dyeing and finishing industry, occupational titles distinguish among "printers, machine"; "printers, screen (automatic flat)"; "printers, screen (automatic rotary)"; and "printers, screen (hand)." With this level of detail, as Groshen (1991) explained, "classifications are not aggregated to avoid combining similar male and female jobs into apparently integrated occupations" (p. 460). By controlling for job title, we can also assume that skill level within occupation is close to constant, thus controlling for different returns to education and skill for men and women (Lemieux, 1993) . The number of occupations surveyed per industry ranges from 19 in paint and varnishes to 71 in wool textiles.
Our key independent variables are gender and unionization. Gender is measured by an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when the employee is female and 0 otherwise. Regarding unionization, the IWS classify a worker as unionized if the majority of production workers in the establishment are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, the definition of union status is at the establishment level: A worker scores 1 for the unionization variable if most workers in his or her establishment are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, whether or not that worker is a union member. In manufacturing, this measure is practically the same as unionization rate.
Descriptive statistics for the key variables used are presented in Table 1 . We first report average wages for all employees in each industry and then for men and women separately. In all industries, women's mean hourly wage is lower than men's. The ratio of women's to men's pay ranges from 0.78 in miscellaneous plastics to 0.93 in cotton and fiber textiles. Hourly wages in industrial chemicals are the highest among both men and women: 6.47 and 6.20, respectively. The extent of union coverage ranges from approximately 21% in cotton textiles to about 80% in industrial chemicals. Aside from cotton, the industries at the lower end of the union representation scale tend to be textiles: wool textiles (26.2%) and men's and boys' shirts (33.5%). On average, more men than women work in unionized establishments.
The percentage of women in these industries varies widely from 5.6% in industrial chemicals to 92.7% in men's and boys' shirts. Not surprisingly, textiles employ greater proportions of women than other industries. Segregation seems common in textiles: Descriptive statistics show that women always work with more women in the establishment than men do. Control variables at the establishment level include size and geographical location because previous research has shown that union workers tend to be concentrated in large firms, which often pay more than small ones, and in Labor, 1976a Labor, , 1976b Labor, , 1977a Labor, , 1977b Labor, , 1977c Labor, , 1977d Labor, , 1977e, 1977f, 1982 . Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
urban areas, which have higher pay than rural areas. Establishment size is measured by six dummy variables, region by four dummy variables, and city size by one dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is located in a metropolitan area. Because gender segregation within firms explains a large portion of earnings inequality between men and women (Bielby & Baron, 1984; Bridges & Nelson, 1989) , we control for the proportion of women in an establishment's workforce.
Variables used as controls at the individual level include detailed occupation dummies (which vary by industry) and incentive pay, a dummy that takes a value of 1 if an employee receives incentive compensation. This last control is important because historical research has shown that the method of payment tends to vary between men and women (Goldin, 1986) .
METHOD
We estimated three standard log-wage equations using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The dependent variable in these equations 478 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings. This semilogarithmic form of wage equation facilitates interpretation of estimated effects: The coefficients approximate the percentage change in wage level resulting from a unit increase in the independent variable. We assume the same wage determination model for men and women. The basis for this premise is the fact that within an establishment, one can reasonably assume that all employees are covered by the same collective bargaining agreement and therefore that wages are set for union as well as nonunion workers. Thus, collective bargaining coverage is the appropriate measure of union status to determine union effects on the earnings of men and women in a given work unit. Table 2 shows the estimates of an OLS model where the log of hourly earnings (W) is regressed on a gender dummy (1 = Female), a union dummy (1 = Union), an interaction variable (Female × Union), and the vector of control variables. The model is as follows: In this model, β 1 measures the gender gap in nonunion establishments and β 1 + β 3 measures the gender gap in union establishments. The reference group is men working in nonunionized establishments. This specification empirically addresses the research question of whether the gender gap differs between union and nonunion establishments (measured by β 3 ). This interaction evaluates whether collective bargaining not only affects wages but also increases wages more for women than men (i.e., if the gender effect is less negative in unionized establishments), thereby lowering the gender wage gap.
RESULTS
The three main coefficients reported in Table 2 are those for the variables female, union, and the interaction between the two. In all industries but one, the coefficient for female is negative and significant, indicating that being a woman in a nonunionized establishment is associated with lower wages by a factor ranging from 8.8% in paints and varnishes to 2.9% in textile dyeing and finishing. Only in men's and boys' shirts is the gender coefficient not significant, if negative, probably because the overwhelming majority of workers in this industry are women.
Estimated union coefficients suggest that collective bargaining coverage is associated with higher wages in almost all the industries studied. These coefficients are positive and significant in seven out of nine industries, ranging from 0.8% in cotton and fiber textiles to 17% in men's and boys' shirts. In wood and household furniture, the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. The only negative union effect is for industrial chemicals; as Anderson et al. (1990) also reported, the wage difference between union and nonunion workers is only 2%, even though 61% of the production workers in this industry are unionized.
As predicted, the interaction between the union and female variables is positive and significant in six of the nine industries, with coefficient values ranging from 1.2% in cotton and fiber textiles to 8.7% in paint and varnishes. For the remaining three industries, one coefficient is not significant at conventional levels (miscellaneous plastics), and two are negative and significant (textile dyeing and finishing and men's and boys' shirts). These results suggest that in most cases, unionized establishments have lower wage gaps between men and women. Consider the nonferrous foundries industry as an example. The estimated gender coefficient indicates that being a woman in a nonunionized establishment in this industry is associated with an approximately 5.7% lower pay rate.
3 For women working in a union establishment, however, the net effect results from adding the female, union, and interaction coefficients (-5.7% + 5.6% + 2.3% = 2.2%). A wage advantage of about 2.2% accrues to women covered by collective bargaining, compared with a wage gap of about -5.7% in nonunion establishments, all other factors kept constant. In sum, in six industries, unionization is associated with a narrower wage gap between unionized men and women relative to men and women in similar jobs in nonunionized establishments. The two industries with a negative and significant interaction of the female and unionization variables are textiles: men's and boys' shirts and textile dyeing and finishing. In these industries, the gender gap in pay is greater in unionized than nonunionized establishments.
Note also that women receive higher wages when unionized, although comparing women in unionized and nonunionized establishments is not the focus of this article. For example, in industrial chemicals, the predicted log wage difference between the two groups of women is 0.035 -0.018 = 0.017. That is, women in union establishments earn about 1.7% higher wages than nonunion women. If similar calculations are done for all industries, women in unionized establishments do earn somewhat more than other women in all but one of the industries, with a gain ranging from about 1.7% to 14%. In sum, women gain from unionization both relative to men (as shown by the significant interactions) and in absolute terms (the coefficient for union plus the coefficient for the interaction add to a positive effect).
The estimated effects of control variables are consistent with prior research. For example, the percentage of women in an establishment has a negative effect on wages in all industries except men's and boys' shirts (an industry where 92% of establishments' workforces are female). Incentive pay has a positive and statistically significant effect on workers' wages in all but one industry. The size of the city where an establishment is located and an establishment's size are positively related to pay levels.
Overall, our estimates are consistent with previously reported studies using similar data, but also reveal that unionization is a significant determinant of the gender wage gap.
DISCUSSION
Our purpose was to determine whether collective bargaining coverage narrows the gender wage gap among manufacturing employees. Our findings provide compelling evidence that the estimated pay disparity between men and women is smaller in unionized establishments in six of the nine industries studied, encompassing a large portion of the manufacturing workforce.
That is, blue-collar women generally benefit from working in unionized plants.
Our findings also corroborate previous research showing the negative impact of establishment gender composition on wages and the need to consider organizational attributes in studies of wage inequality (Huffman & Velasco, 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993 . Our study expands this literature by showing the influence of labor unions in reducing gender wage differentials and theorizing about the direct and indirect effects of collective bargaining on the gender wage gap.
Several reasons may explain the lack of significance or negative interactions found in three industries. These reasons include industry characteristics such as the percentage of women in the workforce, the percentage of women organized, and union characteristics. The first potential explanation is the different proportion of women across manufacturing industries. In fact, two of the three industries (miscellaneous plastics and men's and boys' shirts) have the largest percentages of women in our sample. In both men's and boys' shirts and textile finishing, women's premium for being unionized is smaller than men's, whereas in all other industries, women reap even higher percentage gains from unionization than men. In short, unionization seems to reduce within-establishment gender gaps in pay in most industries, but not in the most female-dominated industries. Moreover, the negative interaction between the union and female variables may indicate a relative weakness of predominantly female unions.
The different findings across industries may also reflect varied levels of commitment by different unions to pay equity issues. This commitment has historically been less consistent across U.S. unions than among unions in other countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada (Hallock, 1993) . Specifically, U.S. unions have placed less emphasis on obtaining equitable wages for all workers, and fewer have set up special women's divisions (Cook, 1991) . The AFL-CIO has endorsed but not necessarily bargained for pay equity, and that at the request of its female members (England, 1992) . This attitude among U.S. unions dates back at least one century and seems related to two factors. On one hand, women's unions united in leagues that took a political approach, allying themselves more with the women's movement than with the labor movement (Jacoby, 1994) . On the other hand, male unions either paid less attention to gender wage inequality or were constrained in their demands by managerial conditions. For example, when the issue of wage inequality with women was raised, management often proposed to limit men's wage increases to pay for the equity differential, thus discouraging male workers from effectively demanding equity (Acker, 1989; Hallock, 1993) . These two forces might have hindered some unions' ability to close the gender gap, especially in those industries where women make up the majority of the workforce.
Another relevant union characteristic that may vary by industry is the number of women occupying leadership positions. Women are often absent in executive union jobs (Cook, 1991) , and even when they are present, they tend to be leaders at the local level and in relatively marginal positions such as chairs of education committees (Melcher, Eichstedt, Eriksen, & Clawson, 1992) . Thus, women are still underrepresented in influential positions where they could participate in collective bargaining negotiations.
Although our data do not allow us to test the above explanations, the historical evolution of unions and gender patterns in the men's and boys' shirts industry offers a fruitful illustration. The garment trades form a labor-intensive and highly competitive industry because of easy entry. Firms are usually in low-wage areas and use new technology that reduces the number of highpaying jobs. Low wages, piecework, and occupational segregation have always characterized this industry with a largely female labor force (Carpenter, 1972) . During the period covered by our data, the three main unions in the garment industries were the craft-oriented United Garment Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), which organized the men's clothing branch of the industry, and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, which organized the women's garment industry. The ACWA finally merged with the Textile Workers Union of America, forming the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Clothing Union in 1976. Partly because women were isolated from the predominantly male labor force, these trade unions remained ambivalent toward women (Acker, 1989) . Union goals of higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions seem to have lost out for years in this industry (Carpenter, 1972) .
In sum, industry gender composition and union characteristics help interpret our results: The women in mostly female establishments within mostly female industries do not benefit as much from union representation as women in more gender-balanced industries. But the effect of unions on the wage gap remains a complex issue.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research should explore other reasons for the different effect across industries. For example, detailed comparisons of union structures and bargaining power in different industries could be examined (Fiorito & Hendricks, 1987) . Similarly, understanding the barriers to full integration of women into union offices might clarify and solve gender differences in union effects (Cornfield, 1993) . Research could also explore the percentage of women in a union, the existence of caucus or women's groups within a union, and the proportion of women in positions of leadership.
Additional research is suggested by our study's limitations. For one thing, the IWS lack data on some worker characteristics, such as education and seniority, both important variables linked to union and gender wage effects (Cornfield, 1987) . However, our study compares men and women working in the same detailed occupations, where differences in terms of education or human capital are likely to be small (Levy & Murnane, 1992) .
A second limitation is that our data are two decades old. Yet, we believe we can generalize our findings through the present for two reasons. First, we are not looking at changes over time in the union effect, nor are we studying the effects of changing unionization rates on wage inequality. Rather, we estimate the effects of unions on women's wages where they are covered by collective bargaining. From this perspective, the role of unions continues to be relevant in reducing wage inequality. Second, recent research using aggregate data confirms that the overall union wage premium has been relatively stable between 1980 (approximately when our data were collected) and 1992 (Wunnava & Peled, 1999) . Moreover, as Card (1998) affirmed, "Despite the shifts in union membership, the structure of union relative wage effects is about the same in the mid 1990s as in the mid 1970s" (p. 20). Wunnava and Peled (1999) also reported that the union premium across different demographic groups during the same period seems to have converged, reinforcing the applicability of our argument. The authors suggest that this convergence relates to the "equalization hypothesis," that is, unions' tendency to raise wages more for workers with lower measured skills, thus helping close gender and racial wage gaps. If the union premium has remained relatively stable despite the decline of overall unionization, our prediction that unions help reduce the wage gap should still hold.
A final limitation lies precisely in our static perspective. Several recent studies have examined the long-term effects on wage inequality of changing unionization rates among men and women. These studies looked at effects for men and women separately, but something similar could be done for the gender gap. For example, Card (1998) found that among women, union membership has declined among low-wage workers but risen for high-wage workers. When looked at separately within sectors and genders, the emerging pattern suggests that unions have strongly deterred increasing wage inequality among public sector workers for both men and women. Future research should consider whether this finding applies to the private sector as well.
CONCLUSION
Past research on the earnings gap between men and women has addressed individual-level variables (e.g., human capital), occupational gender composition, and industry and organizational characteristics. Our work extends previous organizational-level research by examining how unionization affects within-employer gender wage differences in nine manufacturing industries. Our most relevant finding is that unionization is associated with smaller gender gaps, especially in industries where women do not dominate the workforce. The implications of this finding are paramount because a large number of women still work in low-paying jobs in predominantly female industries (Milkman, 1987) .
Our findings have implications for research on inequality as well as for union research and practice. First, collective bargaining structures must be considered in studies of the wage gap that tend to focus mostly on segregation: Unions' impact on the gender gap remains even after controlling for establishment gender segregation. Second, important differences exist, even within manufacturing, on how unions affect the wage gap. These differences are sometimes overlooked when studies compare workers across economic sectors.
From a practical standpoint, if unions lower within-establishment sex gaps in pay, then holding constant how segregated men and women are between establishments, more unionization will lower the economy-wide gender gap in pay. This highlights the importance of continuing efforts at organizing sectors where unionization has declined. Service-sector unions, with their higher female membership bases, have actively negotiated women's issues such as affirmative action, family policies, and pay equity (Hartmann, Spalter-Roth, & Collins, 1994) . Success in these negotiations can affect the extent of later female labor activism (Cornfield, Cavalcanti, & Chun, 1990) . What the service sector unions have done to understand and organize the female workforce could be applied to the blue-collar sector, because women appear to be at least as interested as men in joining unions, and very committed once they have joined (Crain, 1994) .
Finally, our findings suggest that although unions help reduce the gender wage gap, they can do more to incorporate equity concerns in their agendas. As Cook (1991) affirmed, While national unions and officers have given importance to integration of women and minorities, especially in view of the fact that they will be a majority of members by next century, little has been done to impress on the rank and file that the problem of integration is a major one on which the vitality of the unions may well depend in the future. (p. 253) With the erosion of affirmative action policies, women must assume leadership to ensure fair treatment that may no longer be enforced by government agencies (Kirton & Healy, 1999) . This is particularly important in the private sector, where enforcement or attention to pay equity issues is less keen (Creese, 1995) .
NOTES
1. The combination of establishment-and individual-level data is difficult to find in current data because the BLS discontinued the IWS in 1990.
2. We did not have access to the IWS for a few manufacturing industries: basic iron and steel, men's and boys' coats, women's and misses' dresses, footwear, and hosiery. Although we do not have the data, these industries' products, union coverage, and gender composition are relatively similar to those in the industries already included in our study. For example, research on the garment industries suggests that the gender composition and union coverage for the men's and boys' shirts industry are similar to those for men's and boys' coats and women's and misses' dresses industries. Similarly, the gender composition of the nonferrous foundries industry in our sample likely resembles that of the iron and steel industry. We did have data on the fabricated structural steel industry, but we decided against including it in the study; only 0.6% of this industry's workers are female, making it very difficult to conduct appropriate statistical analyses. In other words, although we do not have the complete industry set, our study encompasses more than two thirds of all industries surveyed between 1975 and 1985, before the gender variable was eliminated from the questionnaire, and it includes industries that vary widely in gender composition and union coverage.
3. The coefficient in a semilog regression multiplied by 100 approximates the percentage change in the dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. To be precise, one must take the exponentiated coefficient minus 1 and multiply it by 100. We use the simpler approximation to facilitate relating the text to the tables.
